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Political Globalization

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Introduction

The concept of globalization as used in this chapter refers to the multidimensional, accelerated and interconnected organization of space and time across national borders. Specifically with respect to political globalization it concerns an approach to the social world that stresses postnational and transnational processes as well as a consciousness of the compressed nature of space and time. Political globalization has been much discussed in the globalization literature where the emphasis has been on the decline of the nation-state under the impact of global forces, which have created different kinds of politics arising from, on the one hand, the development of transnational networks and flows, and, on the other, processes of de- and re-territorialization. For some, processes of political globalization open up new emancipatory possibilities while for others globalization leads to a loss of autonomy and the fragmentation of the social world. The approach to political globalization adopted in this chapter highlights the multi-faced nature of globalization, which is best seen as a relational dynamic rather than a new kind of reality. Political globalization, we argue can be understood as a tension between three processes which interact to produce the complex field of global politics: global geopolitics, global normative culture, and polycentric networks.

There can be little doubt that one of the most pervasive forms of political globalization is the world-wide spread of democracy based on the parliamentary nation-state. Democratic government exists in some form in most parts of the world and where it does not, as in China, there is a considerable demand for it by democratic movements. This is a territorially based kind of globalization and largely confined to the political form of the nation-state. It takes traditional forms as well as constituting a new kind of global geopolitics. Since collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the communist regimes in Europe after 1991, democracy has become the universally acceptable form of government. In this sense then globalization does not undermine

the democratic nation-state but gives it world-wide acceptability. The famous thesis of the 'end of history' misinterpreted this to be the end of ideology, since the spread of liberal democracy did not lead to the end of ideology but to the proliferation of more and different kinds of ideology. The democratic nation-state in many parts of the world has given rise to very different kinds of political cultures. The globalization of democratic politics has been the basis of the so-called 'new world order' that has been associated with the bid for world-wide supremacy by the United States and the legitimation of global wars, from the Gulf War to the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the rise of the United States as a global power, global geopolitics is not, as it is often portrayed to be, a *Pax Americana*, or what Carl Schmitt called a new 'Nomos of the Earth', a western world order (Schmitt, 2003). The United States will not be able to establish global supremacy and will be challenged by many centres of power – centres that are mostly states. Thus, the first dimension of political globalization is the geopolitics of global power.

A second dimension of political globalization refers to the rise of a global normative culture. This is independent of geopolitics and is largely legal but diffused in global political communication. One of the main expressions of this is human rights, which lies at the centre of a global cosmopolitanism, but it also includes environmental concerns, which are now global. It is also a dimension of globalization that is not specifically western. As a result of global communication and popular culture etc, political communication is now also global in scope, no longer confined to national borders. National politics is increasingly framed in terms of global discourses. Coupled with the global diffusion of democracy, political communication has become the basis of a global normative culture that has arisen as much in opposition to geopolitics as in support of it. Central to this are the rights of the individual but also include environmental concerns such as sustainable development. The sovereignty of the state has been challenged by the rights of the individual leading to tensions between peoplehood and personhood. States were once the main agents of global norms, but today a global normative culture has come into existence beyond the state system and exists in a relation of tension with states. This global normative culture provides normative reference points for states and an orientation for political actors. As John Meyer and his colleagues have argued, for the first time in history there is now a global culture which provides a frame of reference for all societies (Meyer et al 1997, 2003; Boli and Lechner, 2005). For politics this means that political struggles

and legitimation are ever more connected to global issues. It means that counterpublics as well as states will be shaped by it.

While globalization requires the existence of global players such as powerful states to diffuse and implement a global geopolitics, there is another dimension of globalization that is less related to states and which is not reducible to global normative culture. This may be termed polycentric networks, that is forms of non-territorial politics which emanate from a multiplicity of sites and which cannot be reduced to a single centre. These processes of political globalization are associated with networks and flows, new sources of mobility and communication, and denote new relationships between the individual, state and society. Importantly, polycentric networks are associated with emerging forms of global governance. Whilst the global political order represented by the United Nations is largely based on nation-states, it is possible to speak of a different kind of global political order that can be associated with the notion of global civil society (see Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003). The concept of civil society is much contested and for present purposes it simply refers to the political domain between the state and the market where informal politics takes place. In global terms this corresponds to new spaces beyond the state and the inter-governmental domain and which are independent of global capitalism. A global civil society has come into existence around International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), various grass-roots organizations and social movements of all kinds ranging from globally organized anti-capitalist protests and global civil society movements such as the World Social Forum, anti-sweat shop movements to terrorist movements. One of the distinctive features of global civil society is that it does not have one space but many; it is polycentric and not based on any single principle of organization other than the fact that is globally organized through loosely structured horizontal coalition and networks of activists.

It must be stressed that these three dimensions of globalization do not exist separately from each other, for all are products of globalization and are interrelated. Global civil society, for example, is not separate from geopolitics, but occupies a separate space beyond the state and global market. It exists alongside the state and has been consequential in influencing global geopolitics in the direction of multilateralism and global solidarity. Geopolitics exists under the condition of what Hardt and Negri (2000: xii) call 'Empire': 'a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding

frontiers.’ Global normative culture exists alongside these movements, which Hardt and Negri characterise in terms of Empire versus the Multitude, providing them with a communicative frame of reference with which global politics is increasingly having to define itself. Political globalization generates a complex web of conflicts, dislocations, fluid political forms. In the view of many scholars these dimensions or processes of globalization, in particular, the latter two, all amount to a global polity (e.g. Held, 1995). The argument in this chapter questions this assumption: political globalization is not leading in the direction of a new global order of governance or world society but to transnational political action which challenges neoliberal politics. The logic of globalization bears out the central logic of political modernity in expressing the inner conflict within the political frame of autonomy versus fragmentation: globalization can enhance democracy but it can also fragment democracy by shifting autonomy to capitalism.

The three dynamics of political globalization will be examined in this chapter around four examples of social transformation: the transformation of nationality and citizenship, the public sphere and political communication, civil society, and space and borders.

The Transformation of the Nation-State, Nationality and Citizenship

The notion of the decline of the nation-state in a post-statist world of governance without government - or in a new medievalism of regional economies (Ohmae, 1996) - should be replaced by the idea of the continued transformation of the nation-state. The idea of a zero-sum situation of states disappearing in a global world of markets or replaced by global structures of governance, on the one side, or as in the neo-realist scenario the survival of the so-called Westphalian state as a sovereign actor must be rejected. States continue to be powerful actors but exist in a more globally connected world that they do not fully control (see Sorreson, 2004). The following arguments have been given with respect to the transformation of the nation-under the conditions of largely economic globalization. According to Susan Strange (1996), in the most well known formulation of this position, states have been usurped by global markets. With the transition from a world economy dominated by national economies to a global economy new economic forces come into play challenging the power of the nation-state. Instead of struggling to gain territorial power over other states most states are struggling to control firms that have become rivals to states. The result is that states have to share sovereignty with other global players. In other approaches,

where the emphasis is more on the impact of global civil society the argument is that the nation-state must share sovereignty with non-governmental actors, leading to multi-governance. It is clear that in all these accounts the state is only once source of political power. Much of this revolves around the question of whether states are getting weaker or stronger as a result of global forces. In the case of Europeanization, which is a major area for the application of many of these arguments, at least two positions have emerged. The thesis that transnationalization enhances the power of the nation-state and the thesis of the rise of the regulatory state. According to Alan Milward (1993), European integration, as a movement that has led to the progressive erosion of national sovereignty, has paradoxically rescued the nation-state rather than undermined it. The movement towards transnational authority allows a more functional state system to operate since it is only those functions – for instance, regulation of finance markets and cross-border trade - that the solitary state is less well equipped to perform are transferred upwards to the transnational level. But the result is an unavoidable loss of sovereignty, which does not necessarily translate into a loss of autonomy. According to Majone (1996) the transnationalization of the state in Europe is best seen in terms of a regulatory kind of governance rather than the creation of a new state system that challenges the nation-state. The European Union possesses a large number of independent regulatory authorities, working in fields such as the environment, drugs and drug addiction, vocational training, health and safety at work, the internal market, racism and xenophobia, food safety, aviation safety. States have always had regulatory functions; what is different today is simply these functions are being performed at a transnational level through cooperation with other states. According to Robinson (2001) a transnational state has come into existence. This is a multilayered and multi-centred, linking together on a transnational level many of the functions of statehood. The nation-state does not ‘wither away’ but becomes transformed by becoming a functional component of this transnational apparatus and a major agent of global capitalism. In this analysis, globalization reconfigures the state around global capitalism, making it impossible for nation-states to be independent.

It is evident that what is being discussed here is a transformation of the nation-state rather than its demise. Moreover the European examples detract attention from the world context where the experience has been that the nation-state continues to be the principal political form of societal organization. Throughout Asia, Africa, Central and South America, nation-states are on the whole the main expressions of political

mobilization and identity. Globalization has enhanced not undermined them. The two most powerful actors in the world today, the United States and China, are nation-states. Europe, and the movement is towards transnationalization of the nation-state, is undoubtedly an exception. However, even in Europe, since the most recent enlargement of the European Union, it is arguably the case that the introduction of several new countries in central and eastern Europe will enhance rather than undermine the nation-state for the simple reason that for most of these countries entry into the European transnational order is a means of asserting rather than relinquishing national sovereignty. One only has to consider the result of the French constitutional referendum on the ratification of the European constitution in 2005 to see how consequential national politics can be. However, the aspiration to national autonomy cannot hide the general movement towards the transnationalization of the state and the even more extensive movement towards a geopolitics of global power in which a global state is emerging around the global military-political unification of much of the world. As Martin Shaw has argued, after 1989 and the removal of the Iron Curtain, the bifurcation of global space ceased with the result that the western state system has become a global power (Shaw, 1997). In other words the state has become more diffuse; it is less easily defined in terms of territory or in terms of political community.

A distinction needs to be made between states and nation-states. While most states are nation-states there is an important distinction which is particularly important in the context of political globalization. States, to follow Weber's definition, are centres of the monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory while nation-states refer to the coincidence of the state with a defined political community. It is clearly the case that states are changing in response to globalization, as discussed in the foregoing. States are more flexible in responding to globalization than nations with the result that globalization has exercised tremendous pressure on nation-states, that is on the relationship between political community and exercise of legitimate violence. The resulting crisis of the nation-state is apparent in the transformation of nationality. Two kinds of decoupling processes are evident: the decoupling of nationality and citizenship and the decoupling of nationhood and statehood.

The decoupling of nationality and citizenship can be attributed to the impact of global normative culture which has led to a blurring of the boundary between national and international law. Especially in the countries of the European Union, it now more

difficult for states to resist international law, which has become progressively incorporated into national law. The result of this is that migrants can make direct appeal to international law. International legal tribunals are playing a growing role in national politics. The rights of citizenship no longer perfectly mirror the rights of nationality despite the efforts of states to create lines of exclusion based on nationality (Jacobson, 1996). The erosion of sovereignty has made a huge impact of nationality (Sassen, 1996). In a similar way nationhood and statehood have experienced new lines of tension. There are many examples of the state disconnecting from the nation – France under Chirac is a striking example - with the result that nationhood takes on new and recalcitrant forms as reflected in the rise of the extreme right (see Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002). The transnationalization of the state in the countries of the European Union has undermined the nation-state leading to the rise of new nationalist movements (see Holmes, 2005). The rise of nationalism since the early 1990s in Europe, which coincided with the fall of communism and the enhanced momentum towards European integration created the conditions for a new kind of populist nationalism that has as its central animus the claim to protect the nation from globalization of all kinds, ranging from the transnationalization of the state to global migration and global markets. The nation-state has thus become bifurcated: nation and state have become divorced, each following different logics. The state has become in part transnationalized, while the nation – seemingly in the view of many national publics - abandoned by the state has taken new forms and which can often be enhanced by globalization. A striking example, once again, was in 2005 the French electorate's rejection of the European constitution. Thus many nations are now more shaped by globalization. In any case it is evident that due to the conditions of globalization the nation-state has become dislocated from the state. The political community of the nation does not exercise sovereignty over the state and the state has lost much of its sovereignty.

As Saskia Sassen (2002) and others have argued a further dimension to the global transformation of the nation-state is the rise of subnational politics. Global cities, for example, are products of the denationalization of the nation-state and the rise of non-territorial politics.

The Transformation of the Public Sphere and Communication

Communication is central to politics. Nation-states have been based on centralized systems of communication ranging from national systems of education and science,

national newspapers and media such as TV as well as national commemorations and popular culture in which national narratives and collective identities were codified, reproduced and legitimated. Most nation-states have been based on a national language, which was increasingly standardized over time. In addition, political parties have been at the centre of large scale apparatuses of political communication which they have used for social influence. If the Enlightenment public was based on alleged free discussion, the public today is based on professional political communication and mass persuasion through systematic advertising and lobbying: for Mahew this amounts to a 'new public' (Mahew, 1997). However, as argued by Habermas (1989), communication is an open site of political and cultural contestation and is never fully institutionalized by the state or entirely controlled by elites and their organs of political communication. The public sphere is the site of politics; it is not merely a spatial location but a process of discursive contestation (see Calhoun, 1992; Crossley and Roberts, 2004).

Until now this has been mostly conceived of as a national public sphere. Most of the examples taken by Habermas relate to national public spheres. Moreover the idea of the public sphere was theorized in terms of decline as a result of the rise of the commercial mass media. Although Habermas's (1996) later theory of discursive democracy revitalized the theory of the public sphere - which had in the meanwhile being complemented by alternative conceptions of the public sphere, including the notion of the 'proletarian public sphere', as opposed to the bourgeois public sphere (Negt and Kluge, 2003) – this model remains largely based on national societies. The new social theory of the public sphere has now moved into a wider view of the public sphere as cosmopolitan, with recent contribution noting the existence of non-western public spheres (Hoxeter, et al., 2002) and global public spheres constituted by global civil society and cosmopolitan trends (see Eder 2005; Kögler 2005; Strydom 2002).

While debates continue on the question of the global public sphere as a transnational space, what is more important is the emergence of a global public discourse, which is less a spatially defined entity than a manifestation of discourse (Delanty, 2006). The public sphere is now pervaded by what can be called a global public. By this is not meant a specific public but the global context in which communication is filtered. The global public is the always ever present sphere of discourse that contextualizes political communication and public discourse today. The role of the public in this is of course also well documented, as is evidenced by the significance which is now

attached to the public sphere, and which must be conceived as having a cosmopolitan dimension. The discursive construction of the social world takes place within the wider context of global communication in which the global public plays a key role. The global public has a major resonance in all of communication in the sense that it structures and contextualizes much of public discourse, as examples ranging from human rights, environmental concerns, health and security illustrate.

The global is not outside the social world but is inside it in numerous ways. So it is possible to see political communication in the public sphere as increasingly framed by global issues. In terms of the three-fold conceptualization of globalization discussed earlier, it may be suggested that global normative culture is playing a leading role in shaping political communication. This is due not least to global civil society which has greatly amplified global normative culture. However, global normative culture is diffused in many ways within public spheres and is carried by many different kinds of social agents, including states. Political globalization is most visible in terms of changes in political communication and in the wider transformation of the public sphere. It is possible to speak of a communicative kind of political globalization confronting economic globalization. This is different from global geopolitics, which as argued earlier has led to a transnationalization of the state in line with the rise of a global economy.

The Centrality of Civil Society

We have seen how political globalization is associated with the changing relationships between state, society, and the individual, and the new transnational or global communities, networks and publics which have come into existence and which are in turn driving new forms of politics. Central to understanding these developments is the idea of civil society which perhaps more than any other development has come to symbolize the political potential of globalization, and signal the onset of globalization from below. Before looking at the emerging reality of global civil society it is necessary to give consideration to a related development which we can term the 'civil societalization' of politics, a development stimulated, on the one hand, by the spread of governance practices which coordinate policy both beyond the nation-state and in partnership with a range of social actors not traditionally involved in the mechanisms of government, and, on the other, by shifts in the scale of the local, with social movements and grass-roots politics increasingly coordinated across national boundaries (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005). The 'civil societalization' of politics both

reinforces the idea that politics is increasingly informed by a normative global culture and points to the transformation of the nation-state as a site of political struggle. In other words, the 'civil societalization' of politics signifies a commonality of political forms which link the local and the global, the national and the transnational, and mobilizes a range of actors around common political codes: competitiveness, sustainability, personhood rights, and social justice. 'Civil societalization' has also resulted from the erosion of the state/society distinction inspired by the 'governance turn,' the concomitant transformation in the institutionalization of social and political cleavages, and the increasing connectivity between global and local political forms. Significantly, 'civil societalization' has permeated international relations, and nation-states increasingly choose to mobilize actors in global civil society (for example, the US-sponsored and transnationally organized NGOs and youth movements mobilizing for westernization in the Ukraine), and contest politics in the global public sphere (the legitimation bestowed on Turkey's Kemalist elites resulting from the decision of the Council of Europe to uphold a ban on an Islamicist political party in Turkey, for example).

When considering the importance of global civil society to contemporary thinking about political globalization it is sometimes difficult to separate the facts from the rhetoric: the hopes and aspirations contained in the idea of global civil society often lead to inflated claims as to its importance. For example, Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, claimed that 'there are still two superpowers left on the planet: the United States and global civil society' (Robinson, 2003). This reflects that fact that, for many, the importance of civil society to political globalization lies in its potential to organize resistance to the global hegemony of capitalism and/or the United States.

Global civil society holds the promise of resolving contradictory tendencies which have become central to the experience of globality. The first contradiction is that between the tendency of globalization to homogenise and the increasing emphasis on and respect for difference. The second is the contradiction between the individuating power of globalization, which works to fragment, while at the same time allowing for the construction of new types of autonomy represented by new communities of interest, networked polities, and collective identities. This in turn reveals a very interesting tension between accounts of nationally constituted civil societies and a global civil society which is a main driver of political globalization. This is because

civil society, depending on how it is defined, covers a very broad field of political activity, including democratic contestation within national and sub-national systems, transnational social movements and political contention, and activism which encircles the globe or addresses global issues. In respect of national polities, Keane defines civil society as, ‘the realm of social (privately owned, market-directed, voluntarily run or friendship-based) activities which are legally recognized and guaranteed by the state’ (Keane, 1988: 3). The idea of civil society resonates most strongly with the democratic need for checks and balances, in particular the need to ensure that the state does not become too intrusive or controlling: totalitarianism implies the elimination of civil society. Thus for Krishan Kumar, the popularity and importance of the idea of civil society is that it promises to combine democratic pluralism with state regulation and guidance (Kumar, 1993: 375).

Of course, global civil society is not defined in relation to a state. Although there is no simple consensus on the nature and dynamics of global civil society, we can say that it commonly it refers to a complex of NGO-led political campaigns, transborder social movements, and transnational advocacy networks which have developed global reach and/or address issues of global concern, and which are seen as a force for good (measured in terms of enhanced accountability, democracy, and individual freedom, or more commonly human rights) and work to challenge the institutionalization of the hegemony of nation-states and/or global capitalism. Scholte (2002: 285) defines global civil society as a realm of civic activity which is global in organizational scope, where trans-world issues are addressed, trans-border communications are established, and in which actors organize on the basis of supra-territorial solidarity. On this basis, global civil society comprises organizations such as Greenpeace, Médecins sans Frontiers, the international womens' movement, and the World Social Forum. The tension between national and global civil societies is enduring feature of the literature: they have emerged out of different traditions of political theorizing and are often conceptualized in very different terms. For example, in the classical liberal tradition market relations are seen as natural while civil society is man-made (constructed as a consequence of the need to escape the constant threats of the state of nature). In contemporary cosmopolitan thinking global civil society is often seen as a natural realm (governed by natural law and presumptions of inherent human rights) while markets are artificial and man-made.

In one sense, the globalization of civil society follows the same pattern as for democracy, the nation-state, and citizenship: globalization has resulted in the universalization of territorial norms and practices. At the same time as national norms have become generalized the increasing transnational connectivity of social movements and activists' networks coupled with the globalization of environmental, personhood, and identity politics have worked to remove borders from civil society activity and create new constituencies of interest and new communities of fate. In short, the growth of global civil society is the result of increasing opportunities for interaction between domestic and international politics. These developments raise interesting questions of chronology, the conventional assumption being civil society preceded global civil. However, it is not adequate to view global civil society as an aggregate of previously existing national civil societies: global civil society is founded upon a non-territorial political imaginary. Opinion is very much divided along the lines of whether civil society should be seen as a cohesive political realm, or whether it is better understood as a convenient umbrella term for a range of social movements and NSMs. These issues have further added to the lack of consensus regarding what constitutes global civil society, its relationship with citizenship and democracy, and the extent to which it can exist independently of any state architecture. There is an irony here; the term civil society or transnational civil society is not always used by those commentators who map its development and plot its dynamics (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005), while its existence is concretized by those who criticise it as ineffectual (Laxer and Halperin, 2003).

The centrality of global civil society to political globalization inheres in its location at the confluence of processes leading to the construction of mechanisms of polycentric governance (Scholte, 2004) and the emergence of transnational movements and networks which are working to erode more territorial organizational forms. Moreover, global civil society works to undermine the importance of the territorial state in favour of new forms of networked opposition – Castells' interpretation of the Zapatista rebels in Mexico as the world's 'first informational guerrilla movement' (Castells, 1997) - or encourages individuals to see themselves less exclusively as national citizens but also as cosmopolitan individuals endowed with natural rights.

The Transformation of Spaces and Borders

The image of a 'borderless world' has long been associated with thinking about globalization. The power of global processes to transcend national borders, annihilate

distance, and unite through global catastrophe has provided the globalization literature with a range of powerful metaphors: the ‘global village’; ‘world polity’; ‘fragile earth’. It has also led to an interesting paradox. We are increasingly conscious of the shrinking dimensions or compression of an increasingly interconnected world and the way in which this renders the globe meaningful and brings it within the grasp of all individuals. At the same time the frictionless flows and untrammelled mobilities constitutive of globalization are commonly held to represent a threat to the nation-state, as a result of which economic and political processes are taken beyond the reach of democratically elected polities, and the individuals that constitute them.

It would be too simple to reduce the spatial dynamics of political globalization to a conflict between the flows and mobilities associated with global processes and the spaces and borders of existing political realms. However, there exist interpretations of global transformation which focus on the emergence of multiple and mutually dependent ‘levels’ of political organization – local, regional, national, supra or transnational, global: globalization as a continuum with the local at one end and the global at the other (Held et al, 1999). This serves to both relativize the nation-state and at the same time render it ‘as the normal, abiding state of society and the transnational as new and something derived from globalization’ (Albrow, 1998). Moving beyond the ‘national scheme of things’ we are required to confront to the need to rethink space and borders in the global knowledge economy and the networked society. If we view globalization as social transformation, that is to say a transformation in the very nature of society, its relation to the state and citizens, then we must rethink the nature and meaning of political spaces and borders. In short, the rescaling of politics as a consequence of globalization has caused a major reassessment of the role and meaning of borders and spaces in the construction of polities.

Awareness of the transformative potential of globalization has encouraged a ‘spatial turn’ in the social and political sciences (Castells, 2000a and 2000b; Thrift, 1996). The idea of a spatial turn denotes an increasing interest in the processes by which social space is constructed and the way space is constitutive of social and political relations, not merely the pre-given environment within which social conflicts, institutionalization, governance and social transformations are played out. This thinking has been stimulated on the one hand by the blurring of boundaries between and within existing territorial entities fostered by processes of political, economic and

social globalization, and, on the other, by the rise of political forms which are neither territorially based nor possessing a single centre or origin, such as global civil society.

The relationship between globalization and new political spaces and borders revolves around two key spatial dynamics. The first, is associated with the work of Castells (2000a) who holds that the network society is constituted by the space of flows which exists in tension with a space of places. The space of flows refers to 'social practices without geographical contiguity' (Castells, 2000b: 14), a world of mobility and networked connections, while the space of places refers to a territorially defined form of spatial organization (the nation-state). For Castells, the advent of network society signals the decline of industrial society, the former relying on a space of flows, the latter on a space of places. The second dynamic is best represented by Beck's (2002) idea of 'cosmopolitanization' or 'globalization from within societies'. Beck emphasizes that the nature of state and society is undergoing change as a result of globalization and that inside/outside, and domestic/foreign assume new meanings. For Beck, much more than for Castells, the relationship between spaces and borders is central to understanding political globalization.

These dynamics have given rise to two central themes in the study of political globalization. First, the emergence of new political spaces and the opportunities for bordering/re-bordering which accompany them. Second, an increased emphasis on mobilities, flows, and networks, which either work to connect existing places in novel ways or themselves represent emerging spatial forms. Spaces and borders do not have to be conceived as unitary and exclusive; they can be plural, overlapping, and experiential. Importantly, the nation-state no longer dominates the spatial imagination and global spaces abound. The globe can be experienced as a single political space which can be the focus of political attachments and identities, communities of interest, and can form a sphere of action. For many, the world is a single place and political activity and individual consciousness increasingly reflect this, whether couched in terms of the threat of global warming, the goal of sustainable development, or the equity of fair trade. Globalization has also generated new roles for sub-national regions and allowed for their greater interconnectivity and trans-border networking, intensified opportunities for 'world cities,' and generated an awareness of cosmopolitan spaces created by belonging to a multiplicity of communities and the 'inner mobilities' associated with an increasingly networked world.

The focus on new spaces and new form of connectivity has led to a realization that space is constitutive of social and political relations not simply a 'given' which comes with the territory. The management of space is no longer seen as an essential component of polity-building. In modernity, mastery over space - through bordering mechanisms, infrastructural networks, and institutions of state - was a central to the construction of political community. The domestication of territory and place, and the diminution of space as a physical barrier to the development of cohesive community, was central to the project of governing the nation-state. One important consequence of this shift to spaces of flows is that mobility is increasingly seen as independent of space: postnational and cosmopolitan notions of mobility emphasise the ways in which we regularly move between communities, identities, and roles, and across borders in ways which cannot be mapped onto geographical space.

On the model of the nation-state, borders are seen as mechanisms of state working to create governable territory. Although they still perform this function for the nation-state they also work in other ways, and in the global context have become multiple, relational, and deterritorialized. As Balibar (1998: 220) points out, under conditions of globalization the quantitative relation between borders and territory has been inverted. There are two dimensions to this. One, borders are to be found everywhere, existing both within and between polities. Two, borders have become important spaces in their own right and often take the form of zones of transition or borderlands. Borderlands are zones of interpenetration which 'cut across discontinuous systems' in Sassen's (2000) terms. In doing so they transform relations between inside and outside, us and them, in the way Beck describes. What this means is that the idea of a 'borderless world', once seen as emblematic of globalization, is now revealed as a chimera. Borders are back, and processes of rebordering have emerged alongside debordering, generated by new types of security concerns, the policing of immigration, and the surveillance of mobility (Andreas and Snyder, 2000). Rebordering should not be taken to imply that existing patterns of territorial borders and simply reproduced; borders do not necessarily map directly onto territory and states and they are becoming 'dispersed' throughout society (Balibar, 2004).

Conclusion

Against the background of the shifts outlined in this chapter, away from a state-centric world towards polycentric networks of governance and the development of a global political culture which works, in part, to hold the nation-state in stasis, the central

question generated by political globalization is the degree to which the fragmentation of the social world leads to a loss of political autonomy. The three processes outlined here – the universalization of nationally-contained models of democracy, the onset of a global normative culture, and the ‘civil societalization’ of governance structures – exist in complex and sometimes contradictory relationships. To conclude, we can point to three dilemmas to which these complex relationships give rise and the implications for the tension between autonomy and fragmentation.

First, the globalization of the nation-state, and its model of political membership and institutionalized governance, has given form to the universal aspiration for democracy. On this reading, the nation-state is an important vehicle for political autonomy, via the sovereignty of peoplehood, and democracy is an important badge of membership in a world community of nation-states. At the same time, criticisms of democracy provide a nucleus around which many forms of contentious politics coalesce. Democracy is both universally desired and universally distrusted; for being elitist, authoritarian, formal rather than substantive, imported and inauthentic etc. Wherever democracy exists, democratic deficits are being discovered.

Second, global normative culture, which has been disseminated by INGOs over a long period of time and has scripted the development of the nation-state as a global form, has also acted as a vector for global norms of personhood positing a world of individuals sustained by human rights law. At the same time as working to individuate and fragment these processes also open up the possibilities of new cosmopolitan collectivities created in the recognition that the needs of humanity are prior to those of democracy, and new communities of fate emerging from the recognition that we live in a ‘world risk society’ (Beck, 1999).

Third, polycentric networks, and in particular the development of global civil society, create new opportunities for autonomy and the recognition of a range of new actors and new modes of governance, but, at the same time, can create new instabilities and dangers. Global civil society actors do not necessarily work for peace, freedom, and democratization; the so-called ‘dark-side’ of civil society (Rumford, 2001). The autonomy possessed by civil society actors and the ways in which they lack accountability and democratic credentials, and tend in any case to be self-appointed spokespersons for the causes they espouse, creates new political spaces and transnational networks which can easily be appropriated by terrorists, traffickers in

drugs and people, and organized crime in such a way as to undermine a nascent world polity.

Political globalization has resulted in a new set of tensions around which politics is now structured. Whereas key political conflicts were previously centred on class divisions, state versus civil society, cleavages between traditional and industrial economies, or resistance to imperial rule, supplementary contestations have arisen around a changed set of concerns: the right to difference, individual versus community, liberal democracy versus cosmopolitanism. Indeed, political globalization has worked to create the possibility for a proliferation of sites of political conflict around an expanded set of concerns: governance, identity, mobilities, and community prominent amongst them.

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